My work is mainly in epistemology. I am interested in the norms of rationality and the question of what exactly those norms govern. Currently I am exploring accounts of rationality where the reasoning process is central, and how traditional philosophical treatments of these issues can cohere (or conflict) with a such an account. One focus of my work is to explore how one could develop an account of “bayesian reasoning” in a way that agents can, in principle, satisfy.

I also do work in the philosophy of religion, where I think about the nature of faith in particular religious traditions, and how theological particulars of a religion inform how they understand the term. I also have interests in the philosophy of science (explanation, logical empiricism) and enlightenment-era African philosophy and theology.

Works in progress

• A paper on the bank cases: I attempt to show that the bank cases don’t necessarily motivate pragmatic encroachment: those who have intuitions sympathetic to the outcomes in the bank cases needn’t accept pragmatic encroachment, having recourse in a solution acceptable to epistemic purists.
• A paper on reformed epistemology: I try to defend the idea that a truly “reformed” notion of faith is a much more austere one, thus changing how we relate the analysis of ordinary uses of faith to a specifically (reformed) Christian notion of faith.
• A paper on Pascal’s wager: I argue that the wager has great force towards a conclusion other than believing given the stakes (with Jack VanDrunen)